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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jason Paul Lacas appeals from his convictions for violation of a no-contact order,
DUI, open container, and possession of marijuana, claiming trial errors.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Lacas with felony violation of a no contact order and
misdemeanor counts for open container, DUI, and possession of marijuana, committed on
September 27, 2019. (R., pp. 20-21.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp. 26-32.)
At trial Jade Rider testified that she was Lacas’s girlfriend of many years and they
had a daughter together. (Trial Tr., p. 91, L. 14 – p. 92, L. 22.) A no-contact order was in
place prohibiting Lacas from having contact with Rider. (Trial Tr., p. 93, L. 21 – p. 94, L.
22; p. 135, Ls. 2-8; p. 136, L. 19 – p. 137, L. 14; p. 151, L. 22 – p. 152, L. 9; State’s Exhibit
1.) When an officer stopped Lacas’s car, Rider was a passenger in the car. (Trial Tr., p.
92, L. 23 – p. 93, L. 20; p. 131, L. 7 – p. 133, L. 22.) The officer suspected Lacas of driving
under the influence and conducted field sobriety tests, which Lacas mostly failed. (Trial
Tr., p. 137, L. 15 – p. 142, L. 22.) The officer administered a breath test, and Lacas scored
.089/.096. (Trial Tr., p. 142, L. 23 – p. 149, L. 12; State’s Exhibit 3.) A drug dog alerted
on the car, and in the car officers found marijuana and open containers of alcohol. (Trial
Tr., p. 107, L. 11 – p. 112, L. 19; p. 126, L. 6 – p. 127, L. 15; p. 135, L. 21 – p. 136, L. 18;
State’s Exhibit 4.)
Lacas testified in his own defense. He admitted having an open container and
marijuana in the car. (Trial Tr., p. 178, Ls. 10-19.) He admitted he had been drinking.
(Trial Tr., p. 178, Ls. 20-22.) He admitted driving in the car with Rider. (Trial Tr., p. 183,
1

L. 24 – p. 184, L. 6.) He contended, however, that he believed the no-contact order had
either expired or been terminated. (Trial Tr., p. 178, L. 23 – p. 181, L. 2; p. 181, L. 24 –
p. 183, L. 3.) He admitted in cross examination that it had not in fact expired or been
terminated at the time he was stopped. (Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 4 – p. 190, L. 17; p. 192, Ls.
9-13.)
The jury found Lacas guilty on all counts. (R., pp. 34-35.) The district court
sentenced Lacas to five years with one and one-half years fixed on the felony, 180 days
jails with credit for time served on the misdemeanors, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.
40-45.) Lacas filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 52-53.)

2

ISSUES
Lacas states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err when it allowed the State, on crossexamination, to inquire into whether Mr. Lacas was on probation for
a previous conviction for violating the no-contact order?

II.

Did the district court err when it allowed the State, on rebuttal, to
introduce the previous judgment of conviction for the misdemeanor
violation of the no-contact order?

III.

Did the district court err when [it] modified the jury instruction on
the essential element of notice and effectively precluded the jury
from considering Mr. Lacas’ defense?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Lacas supported his defense that he was unaware of the no-contact order with
testimony that his probation officer authorized the contact. Has Lacas failed to show that
the district court erred by allowing cross-examination on whether Lacas’s probation
included a prior no-contact order violation to impeach this testimony?
2.
When questioned about whether he was on probation for violation of a no-contact
order Lacas testified he was not. Did the district court err by allowing the state to impeach
this testimony with evidence Lacas was in fact on probation for violating a no-contact
order?
3.
The district court instructed the jury to find the notice element it must find proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Lacas had notice “of the existence” of the no-contact order.
Is Lacas’s argument that this was error preserved? If preserved, does it lack merit?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Lacas Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s Determination That
Cross-Examination Of Lacas Regarding Whether He Was On Probation For Violating A
No-Contact Order Was Proper
A.

Introduction
Lacas testified on direct examination that he was “astounded” when the issue of a

no-contact order “came up” because he was on “probation, and [he] had permission from
[his] first request from [his] probation officer to be with [his] partner.” (Trial Tr., p. 178,
L. 23 – p. 179, L. 9.) He believed he was “taking the right steps” by asking his probation
officer to see Rider and their child and that his “request” was “approved.” (Trial Tr., p.
182, L. 11 – p. 183, L. 3.)
In a side-bar, the district court ruled that the prosecution could, in crossexamination, elicit testimony that Lacas was on probation for violation of a no-contact
order, overruling Lacas’s objection that it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. (Trial
Tr., p. 183, L. 8; p. 194, L. 19 – p. 196, L. 23.) The prosecutor asked Lacas if he was on
probation for violating a no-contact order and Lacas denied it, stating he was on probation
for possession of a controlled substance. (Trial Tr., p. 190, L. 20 – p. 191, L. 15. 1)
On appeal Lacas contends that the evidence was not relevant and any probative
value was substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 9-16.) This argument lacks merit. Evidence that Lacas was on probation for
violating a no-contact order made his testimony that his probation officer had given him

1

The record shows that on May 25, 2018, Lacas was placed on supervised probation for
two years for violating a no-contact order. (Sate’s Exhibit 6; PSI, p. 93.) Admissibility of
evidence showing Lacas testified falsely about his probation is addressed in Section II,
below.
4

permission to have contact with the subject of a no-contact order less likely, and the district
court properly exercised its discretion when it weighed the potential for unfair prejudice.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the

decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Shutz,
143 Idaho 200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006). “The district court’s ruling that the
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice may be overturned only for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Labelle, 126 Idaho
564, 567, 887 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1995).

C.

Lacas Has Shown Neither Irrelevance As A Matter Of Law Nor An Abuse Of
Discretion
Relevant evidence is “admissible unless these rules, or other rules applicable in the

courts of this state, provide otherwise.” I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it “has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and
the more or less likely fact “is of consequence in determining the action.” I.R.E. 401.
“This Court has said that for evidence ‘[t]o be admissible, the evidence must be relevant to
a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged.’” State v. Sanchez, 165 Idaho
563, 572, 448 P.3d 991, 1000 (2019) (quoting State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 445, 180
P.3d 476, 484 (2008)). “Whether a fact is material is determined by its relationship to the
legal theories presented by the parties.” State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 100-01, 334 P.3d
280, 291-92 (2014).
Here, Lacas presented the theory that he believed the no-contact order had expired
or been terminated and bolstered that theory with his testimony claiming that his probation
5

officer had granted him permission to be with Rider. Thus, evidence tending to make the
factual claim that Lacas had his probation officer’s permission to be with Rider more or
less likely was relevant to his theory of the case. That Lacas was specifically on probation
for violating a no-contact order involving Rider made Lacas’s testimony less likely true.
The evidence was relevant as a matter of law.
Nor did the district court err in balancing the potential for unfair prejudice. “The
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of … unfair prejudice ….” I.R.E. 403. “Rule 403 does not offer protection against
evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to the party’s case. The
rule protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it tends to suggest
decision on an improper basis.” State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct.
App. 1994). Unfair prejudice analysis is based on “the probable effect of the evidence on
the jury,” specifically the tendency of the evidence to “generate hostility or a presumption
of guilt in the minds of the jury, or to cause the jury to infer that the defendant is a bad
person deserving of punishment in any event.” State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862
P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). “[E]vidence should be excluded if it invites inordinate
appeal to lines of reasoning outside of the evidence or emotions which are irrelevant to the
decision making process.” State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604, 809 P.2d 455, 465
(1991). “To an extent, any evidence is prejudicial to the party whose theory of the case it
contradicts. However, the focus is on unfair prejudice.” State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353,
470 P.3d 1162, 1170 (2020) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
As shown above, the evidence that Lacas was on probation for violating a nocontact order made it less likely that his probation officer gave him permission to be with
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Rider while a no-contact order was still in effect. The district court concluded this
probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because Lacas had
already testified about being on probation and “because both Ms. Rider and the Defendant
had testified that there were numerous no-contact orders between the parties.” (Trial Tr.,
p. 194, L. 25 – p. 196, L. 17; see
- p. 96, L. 12 – p. 97, L. 23; p. 178, L. 23 – p. 179, L. 9; p.
182, L. 11 – p. 183, L. 3.) The district court properly exercised its discretion when it
determined that evidence that Lacas was on probation for violating a no-contact order was
only incrementally prejudicial to evidence Lacas already presented, and that its probative
value to discredit Lacas’ testimony his probation officer granted his request to be with
Rider was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
On appeal Lacas argues presenting evidence he did not know about the no-contact
order did not “open the door” to admission of evidence he was on probation for violation
of a no-contact order and that such evidence does not go to his credibility. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 12-14.) This argument does not withstand analysis. As noted above, Lacas
testified that one of the reasons he allegedly did not know the protective order was in force
was that his probation officer had specifically given him permission to be with Rider. That
Lacas was on probation for violating a no-contact order made it at least less likely that the
probation officer would (1) grant permission despite the existence of the order, (2) be
ignorant of the existence of the no-contact order, or (3) would not check if there were an
extant no-contact order before granting specific permission to visit a prior victim of a nocontact order violation. The evidence made it less likely that Lacas was telling the truth
when he claimed he had his probation officer’s permission to be with Rider.

7

Lacas next argues the district court abused its discretion by weighing the probative
value against its potential for unfair prejudice. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16. 2) However,
because Lacas has failed to identify the relevancy of the evidence, his argument about
weighing is faulty. Lacas is wrong when he says he can present evidence that his probation
officer sanctioned his conduct, thus leading him to believe there was no no-contact order,
and the state would not be able to rebut that testimony with evidence making it unlikely to
be true.
In this case, as shown above, Lacas presented testimony that his probation officer
had granted Lacas’s request to be with Rider. Evidence showing Lacas’s probation was
for violation of a no-contact order makes it less likely that the claimed fact was true. The
district court properly concluded the potential for unfair prejudice was offset by already
admitted evidence that there had been prior no-contact orders and that Lacas was on
probation. The district court was within its discretion when it concluded that the offset
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. 3

2

In making this argument Lacas claims the district court made an “implicit finding” that
the jury already knew he had previously violated a no-contact order and determined there
was “no risk of unfair prejudice.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) The first of these claims
is without any basis because it is cut from whole cloth and the second is directly contrary
to the record. (Trial Tr., p. 195, L. 15 – p. 196, L. 10 (saying the evidence was not “unduly
prejudicial” and not “so unfairly prejudicial” that it had to be excluded).)
3
In closing arguments Lacas’s counsel conceded, based on Lacas’s trial testimony, that
Lacas was guilty of the DUI, open container, and marijuana charges and invited the jury to
convict. (Trial Tr., p. 279, L. 25 – p. 281, L. 3.) Thus, any errors at trial (as claimed in
issues I-III) were necessarily harmless as to those convictions. See, e.g., State v. Hochrein,
154 Idaho 993, 1001, 303 P.3d 1249, 1257 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho
544, 545 n. 1, 768 P.2d 807, 808 n. 1 (Ct. App. 1989). Only the conviction for violation
of the no-contact error is truly at issue in this appeal.
8

II.
Lacas Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of A Judgment Showing That Lacas’s
Trial Testimony Was Likely False
A.

Introduction
Lacas testified that his probation officer had granted his request to see Rider. (Trial

Tr., p. 178, L. 23 – p. 179, L. 9; p. 182, L. 11 – p. 183, L. 3.) When the state cross-examined
him about whether he was on probation for a prior no-contact order violation, Lacas denied
it. (Trial Tr., p. 190, L. 20 – p. 191, L. 15.) In rebuttal, the state moved to admit Exhibit
6, a certified copy of a misdemeanor judgment filed May 28, 2018, placing Lacas on
probation for two years for violation of a no-contact order. (State’s Exhibits 6; Trial Tr.,
p. 197, Ls. 8-19.) Lacas objected to admission of the exhibit on relevance and I.R.E. 403
grounds of jury confusion and being cumulative. (Trial Tr., p. 198, L. 5 – p. 199, L. 10.)
Lacas presented a document he claimed was an “amended judgment” that “says there was
a probation violation” and that Lacas “served 60 days in jail” and the document “doesn’t
even indicate if he was or was not on probation.” (Trial Tr., p. 198, L. 23 – p. 199, L. 4;
Aug., p. 1.) Lacas’s counsel argued that he did not know if the document he was
referencing altered the original judgment and “did or didn’t affect probation.” (Trial Tr.,
p. 199, L. 25 – p. 200, L. 4.)
The district court reviewed the state’s proposed exhibit and found it was a signed
judgment dated 5/25/18 and related documents showing Lacas pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order, and “it does indicate clearly that the
Defendant was placed on supervised probation.” (Trial Tr., p. 201, L. 10 – p. 202, L. 5.)
The district court found that the evidence was offered to impeach Lacas’s testimony that
he was not on probation for violating a no-contact order. (Trial Tr., p. 202, Ls. 6-11.) The

9

district court reviewed the document Lacas had referenced in his objection, and found it
did not indicate that the probation had been terminated. (Trial Tr., p. 202, L. 12 – p. 203,
L. 8.) The court then ruled that State’s Exhibit 6 was proper rebuttal evidence “to challenge
the credibility of the Defendant as to whether he was or was not or knew or should have
known that he was on supervised probation for criminal case 6824” and was therefore
“relevant for purposes of impeachment” and that it was admissible under the balancing test
of unfair prejudice. (Trial Tr., p. 203, Ls. 12-24; p. 204, L. 20 – p. 205, L. 11.) The district
court found the evidence was not cumulative and did not pose a risk of jury confusion.
(Trial Tr., p. 203, L. 25 – p. 204, L. 16.)
The district court also specifically and repeatedly stated that the defense was free
to offer its own evidence to rebut Exhibit 6. (Trial Tr., p. 203, Ls. 9-12; p. 204, Ls. 17-19.)
The defense declined to present any sur-rebuttal evidence. (Trial Tr., p. 206, Ls. 1-6; p.
212, L. 19 – p. 213, L. 3.)
On appeal Lacas argues State’s Exhibit 6 was irrelevant because it was superseded
by an amended judgment. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-20.) His argument fails on the law
and the facts. As found by the district court, the document Lacas identified to the district
court does not show that Lacas was terminated from probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The rules of construction of contracts and written documents in general apply to

the interpretation of court orders.” Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289,
1293 (1986). “Whether a court order is ambiguous is a question of law. Interpretation of
an unambiguous court order is also a question of law.” Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873,
880, 292 P.3d 264, 271 (2012) (citation omitted). “If the language is reasonably susceptible
10

to differing meanings, however, it is deemed ambiguous and determination of its meaning
is a question of fact.” McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928 (Ct.
App. 2008). “The trial court’s interpretation of an ambiguous judgment or decree will be
upheld on review if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Id.

C.

Lacas Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of State’s Exhibit 6 To Rebut His
Testimony That He Was Not On Probation For A No-Contact Violation At The
Time Relevant To This Charge
The plain language of Exhibit 6 put Lacas on supervised probation for two years

from May 25, 2018, upon his guilty plea to violation of a no-contact order. (State’s Exhibit
6.) The document Lacas referred to when objecting did not, on its face, rescind that
probation order. (Aug., p. 1.) As stated by the prosecutor below, the document Lacas
referenced shows he “pled guilty to a probation violation on that day and that the judge
ordered 60 days in custody. That’s the entirety of the document.” (Trial Tr., p. 199, Ls.
21-24.) The document says nothing about terminating probation early, and did not, as a
matter of law, render State’s Exhibit 6 irrelevant.
Even if the document were not clear on its face, the district court did not err by
rejecting the claim that it shows probation ended on May 25, 2018. “The court must decide
any preliminary question about whether … evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the
court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.” I.R.E. 104(a). “When the
relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the fact does exist.” I.R.E. 104(b). “In applying a judgment, if
the language be in any degree uncertain, we may properly refer to the circumstances
surrounding the making of the order or judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it
was entered.” Evans v. City of Am. Falls, 52 Idaho 7, ___, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932)
11

(quotation marks omitted). See
also ----------Lester v. Lester, 104 Idaho 244, 245, 658 P.2d 915,
- --916 (1983) (“When a court hearing an action to enforce a judgment finds the judgment
ambiguous, it may refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment in
attempting to interpret it.”) Exhibit 6, on its face, is a judgment placing Lacas on probation
for the misdemeanor offense of violation of a no-contact order for a two-year period that
covers the September 27, 2019, charge at issue. (State’s Exhibit 6.) The only fact at issue
regarding relevance is whether the probation was still in effect.
State’s exhibit 6 is a judgment against the defendant on his guilty plea on the charge
of “No Contact Order Violation—Misd.” (State’s Exhibit 6.) It was entered on 5/25/18.
(Id.) It imposes fines, court costs, and public defender reimbursement, and a sentence of
180 days, concurrent “with any jail sentence previously ordered.” (Id.) The judgment
grants credit for 12 days served, suspends 158 days, and allocates thirty days “to be served
at the discretion of the probation officer.” (Id.) It placed Lacas on “24 months” supervised
probation. (Id.) On its face, this exhibit is relevant to the question of whether Lacas was
on probation for a no-contact order violation on September 27, 2019, and therefore testified
falsely that he was not on probation for a no-contact order violation on that date or earlier.
Review of the document put forth by Lacas shows that the district court did not
clearly err in its finding that the document did not show that the probation evidence by the
judgment in State’s Exhibit 6 had terminated. That document is also titled “judgment,”
lists Lacas as the defendant, and has the same case number as State’s Exhibit 6. (Aug., p.
1.) It is dated October 4, 2018. (Id.) It lists “NCO Violation PV” as the charge. (Id.) It
indicates Lacas pled guilty and enters a conviction. (Id.) The portion of the form related
to payments is blank. (Id.) It orders Lacas to serve 60 days jail and gives him credit for
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all 60 days. (Id.) The portion of the form related to probation is blank. (Id.) To believe
this document released Lacas from probation, this Court would have to accept that upon
Lacas’s probation violation the magistrate commuted his sentence to 60 days already
served from 180 days and released him from his probation and fines and fees sub silentio.
Defense counsel acknowledged that he did not “know if that [document] alters [probation]
or not. It doesn’t indicate—there is no markings on probation, so I don’t know. There are
no minutes for me to make an argument off that document, if it did or didn’t affect
probation.” (Trial Tr., p. 199, L. 25 – p. 200, L. 4.)
The district court did not clearly err by concluding that Lacas had failed to show
that State’s Exhibit 6 was not relevant evidence that Lacas was on probation on or about
September 27, 2019. To the contrary, because the jury could have decided the probation
was still in effect based on the evidence before the court, the district court properly held
State’s Exhibit 6 was relevant to whether Lacas had testified truthfully, but that Lacas could
challenge its probative value by presenting evidence that the probation had been earlier
terminated. Importantly, Lacas’s counsel conceded as much and further admitted he had
no additional evidence to support his claim. Neither the applicable law nor the record
support Lacas’s claim of error.
Lacas claims the document “unambiguously showed that Mr. Lacas was not on
probation” for the no-contact order conviction in September of 2019. (Appellant’s brief, p.
17 (emphasis original).) Lacas’s argument is without merit.
Initially, Lacas’s argument is unpreserved. At no point did he argue to the trial
court that the October 4, 2018, document was “unambiguous.” To the contrary, trial
counsel specifically admitted that the document was ambiguous. (Trial Tr., p. 199, L. 25
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– p. 200, L. 4.) (“So I don’t know if that alters or not. It doesn’t indicate—there is no
markings on probation, so I don’t know. There are no minutes for me to make an argument
off that document, if it did or didn’t affect probation.”). “A party must raise both the issue
and their position on that issue before the trial court for this Court to review it.” Siercke v.
Siercke, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 476 P.3d 376, 382 (2020). Lacas’s appellate argument that
the document unambiguously shows probation was terminated is contrary to his argument
at the trial court that because he could not tell Lacas’s probation status from the documents,
then the jury would necessarily be confused trying to resolve the issue.
If the merits of Lacas’s argument are reached, he has failed to show error. First,
Lacas calls the document an “Amended Judgement,” going so far as to claim that this is the
“title of the document.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) This claim, made without citation
to the record, is false. The document’s title is “judgment,” and only “judgment.” (Aug.,
p. 1. 4) Lacas’s argument is contrary to the record.
Second, Lacas claims the fact that no boxes are checked in the probation section
indicates the previously imposed probation was terminated. (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)
However, nothing in the document gives any indication that probation was terminated.
Moreover, the court did not execute the sentence, only 60 days of the 180 day sentence.
Nothing indicates the court commuted the unserved portion of the sentence, indicating at
least 98 days of the sentence was still suspended. Given that probation was not terminated
and a majority of the sentence was still suspended, Lacas’s argument that the document
clear terminates probation is without basis.

4

The bar code stamped on the bottom of the document, likely by the clerk, does say
“amended judgment.” (Aug., p. 1.)
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Finally, Lacas points out that the box showing the document was sent to the
probation office was not checked, as it was in State’s Exhibit 6. (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)
However, if the court intended to terminate probation it would certainly have sent the
document to the probation office so they knew of that. Only if the court concluded that
entry of the order made no change in the probation status does it make sense to not send
the document to the probation office.
The district court concluded State’s Exhibit 6 was relevant but rebuttable evidence
that Lacas was on probation on or around September 27, 2019. The law and the record
support that conclusion. Lacas has failed to raise a preserved claim of error and, even if
considered, the argument he makes is without merit.

III.
Lacas Has Shown No Error In The Jury Instructions
A.

Introduction
The state presented a copy of the no-contact order issued in Canyon County case

number CR14-18-6824 as evidence. (State’s Exhibit 1.) That copy does not indicate the
order was served on Lacas. (Id.) The state also presented a copy of a motion to amend the
no-contact order filed in Canyon County case number CR14-18-06824 by Lacas acting pro
se. (State’s Exhibit 2.) The motion to amend was dated August 27, 2018, and file-stamped
September 4, 2018. (State’s Exhibit 2.) The state also presented, for illustrative (crossexamination) purposes, a copy of the order terminating the no-contact order on the victim’s
motion on October 10, 2019. (State’s Exhibit 5; Trial Tr., p. 188, L. 2 – p. 190, L. 17.)
Finally, the state filed a copy of a judgment for violating a no-contact order in Canyon
County case number CR14-18-6824. (State’s Exhibit 6.)
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Lacas testified that he believed the no-contact order had expired or been terminated.
(Trial Tr., p. 178, L. 23 – p. 181, L. 2; p. 181, L. 24 – p. 183, L. 3.) He admitted, however,
he “was clearly aware there was a no-contact order.” (Trial Tr., p. 187, Ls. 2-8.)
The district court instructed the jury that to convict it had to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the elements of violation of a no-contact order, including that “Defendant
has contact with Jade Rider in violation of the order” and “before such contact the
Defendant had notice of the existence of the order.” (Aug., p. 19; Trial Tr., p. 259, L. 4 –
p. 260, L. 21; p. 265, Ls. 4-16.) Lacas objected, taking the “position [that] knowledge of
the existence of the no-contact order is not sufficient and the State has to prove as an
element of the defense that the Defendant was either served or signed the no-contact order.”
(Tr., p. 260, L. 24 – p. 261, L. 9. 5) The district court “note[d] the Defendant’s objection
that the State actually has to prove that the Defendant was served or signed in order to
prove the Defendant guilty of the criminal count of violating a no-contact order” and denied
the objection. (Trial Tr., p. 261, Ls. 19-24.)
On appeal, Lacas argues that “knowledge of the existence of a no-contact order is
not sufficient to prove the notice element,” claiming this is the argument he made to the
district court. (Appellant’s brief, p. 20 (emphasis original).) His argument fails because
he is not making the argument he made below. Below he argued that the state had to prove
compliance with the service requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 to establish notice. He abandons
that argument on appeal and instead argues that the district court’s instruction was

5

Lacas had made the same argument in support of his Rule 29 motion for acquittal. (Trial
Tr., p. 227, Ls. 7-14; p. 229, L. 1 – p. 236, L. 14; p. 239, L. 16 – p. 240, L. 25; p. 242, L. 9
– p. 243, L. 10.) The district court modified the instruction in response to that erroneous
argument. (Trial Tr., p. 253, L. 9 – p. 260, L. 21.)
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erroneous for different reasons.

His argument is therefore unpreserved.

Even if

considered, however, he has failed to show that the instruction is erroneous.

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court reviews the trial court’s jury instructions de novo to determine whether,

when considered as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues and state the
applicable law.” State v. Medina, 165 Idaho 501, 507, 447 P.3d 949, 955 (2019) (quotation
marks omitted).

C.

Lacas Has Failed To Show That Notice Of “The Existence” Of The No-Contact
Order Fails To Adequately State The Notice Requirement For Violation Of A NoContact Order
Idaho Code § 19-920(3) provides that “violation of a no contact order is punishable”

by fines and imprisonment. The statute “does not explicitly list prior notice of the no
contact order as an element.” State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993, 999, 303 P.3d 1249, 1255
(Ct. App. 2013). However, notice is still a required element of the crime. Id.
The district court instructed the jury that to convict, it had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that before his contact with Rider “the Defendant had notice of the
existence of the order.” (Aug., p. 19.) This is a modification of the standard jury
instruction, which provides “before such contact the defendant had notice of the order.”
(ICJI 1282.) The record shows the district court made this alteration to clarify that the
“notice” requirement did not include formal notice through the procedures required by
I.C.R. 46.2 as argued by Lacas.
Lacas argued in support of his motion for acquittal that failure to prove compliance
with the service requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 meant the state had failed to prove the notice
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element of the crime. (Trial Tr., p. 227, Ls. 7-14; p. 229, L. 1 – p. 236, L. 14; p. 239, L.
16 – p. 240, L. 25; p. 242, L. 9 – p. 243, L. 10.) In rejecting this argument, the district
court also announced its intent to instruct the jury that notice of the existence of the nocontact order was sufficient to meet the state’s burden. (Trial Tr., p. 259, L. 4 – p. 260, L.
19.) Recognizing that the court’s rejection of his acquittal argument had decided the issue,
Lacas nevertheless took the “position [that] knowledge of the existence of the no-contact
order is not sufficient and the State has to prove as an element of the defense that the
Defendant was either served or signed the no-contact order.” (Tr., p. 260, L. 24 – p. 261,
L. 9.) This argument is meritless.
Rule 46.2 requires service and other procedure, but “does not create an element of
the offense or a condition precedent for the prosecution of the violation of a no-contact
order under section 18-920(2).” Joyner v. State, 156 Idaho 223, 230, 322 P.3d 305, 312
(Ct. App. 2014). To convict Lacas of this offense the “state needed only to establish that
[he] had contact with the victim in violation of the valid no-contact order and with notice
that the no-contact order was in effect.” State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 223, 231, 358 P.3d 784,
792 (Ct. App. 2015). The district court correctly rejected Lacas’s theory that proof of
compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 was a necessary prerequisite to his conviction.
Lacas insists that he is making the same argument on appeal as he made below.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) If accepted at his word, this Court should reject that argument
on the merits because Lacas argued incorrectly below that compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 was
a necessary component of the state’s proof of the notice element.
To the extent Lacas makes an argument other than one premised on I.C.R. 46.2, his
argument should be rejected as unpreserved. “This Court has made clear that a central rule
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of appellate review is that this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221-22, 443 P.3d 231, 235-36 (2019) (quotation
marks and brackets omitted). “[B]oth the issue and the party’s position on the issue must
be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.” State v. Gonzalez,
165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). Here the theory presented by Lacas below
was that to meet the notice element, the state had to prove compliance with the notice
provisions of I.C.R. 46.2. (Trial Tr., p. 227, L. 7 – p. 261, L. 9.) Any argument regarding
any other alleged deficiency in the notice element language is not preserved.
Even if preserved, Lacas’s argument is without merit. In Hochrein, 154 Idaho at
999-1000, 303 P.3d at 1255-56, the Court of Appeals used the terms “notice of the no
contact order” and “notice of the existence of the no contact order” interchangeably. The
instruction given here merely made it clearer that the notice need not be formal notice as
provided by I.C.R. 46.2, but could be instead informal notice, evidenced by the fact that
Lacas filed a motion to amend the order and was on probation for violating the order. Lacas
was guilty of the offence of violation of the no-contact order if he had prohibited contact
with notice, however acquired, of the order preventing that contact.
Lacas argues the instruction misstates the law. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-24.)
Specifically, he claims that the modified language allows a finding of notice even if the
order was no longer in effect (Appellant’s brief, p. 22) and “effectively foreclosed” his
claim that he mistakenly believed the order had been terminated (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2223). 6 His argument does not withstand review.

6

Again, at no point did Lacas argue to the district court that the language used to define
the notice element did either of these things.
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“Whether the instruction was erroneous will depend upon how a reasonable juror
would have interpreted the instruction.” State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 227-28, 335
P.3d 561, 567-68 (2014). Other than his naked claims, Lacas does not articulate how the
language “notice of the order” (ICJI 1282) allows consideration of the validity of the order
and whether Lacas was reasonably mistaken about its applicability in a way that “notice of
the existence of the order” (Aug., p. 19) does not. Analysis shows the contrary.
Lacas’s defense was that he believed the no-contact order had expired or been
terminated, based on alleged statements by Rider and an alleged permission to see Rider
granted by his probation officer. To the extent such a mistake of fact would have negated
“notice of the order,” it would also have negated “notice of the existence of the order.”
Either way, Lacas’s defense that he did not have notice that contact was prohibited because
the order had been terminated was the same. Lacas has not shown that a reasonable juror
would have interpreted the instruction in a manner that foreclosed his defense.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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